Arcane: Delegated users:update permission allows admin account takeover via password reset (no privilege-hierarchy check)
Published Oct 16, 2026 · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Original summary
Normalized public record · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Arcane: Delegated users:update permission allows admin account takeover via password reset (no privilege-hierarchy check)
Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.
QFinch assessment
## Summary A user holding the delegated `users:update` permission can reset the global administrator's password and take over the admin account. `UpdateUser` sets the target user's `PasswordHash` from the request body for ANY target with no comparison of caller-vs-target privilege. Because role assignment and role CRUD are deliberately gated by `RequireGlobalAdmin`, `users:update` is intended to sit BELOW admin (profile management); this finding defeats that separation.
Evidence: public source recordsAffected products
| Affected package, product or range | Fix status |
|---|---|
| Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions. | Consult source advisory |
Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.
Remediation
Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.
- Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
- Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
- Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Evidence coverage
- SSVC priority
- MEDIUM
- Confidence
- Not available
- Aliases
- None reported
Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.
Sources and record history
Record history
Published Oct 16, 2026 · Last refreshed Nov 3, 2026