Moquette: Pattern-ACL wildcard injection (cross-tenant authorization bypass) plus a remote-unauthenticated DoS cluster, a Will-message authorization bypass, and a cross-session durable-corruption bug
Published Sep 23, 2026 · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Original summary
Normalized public record · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Moquette: Pattern-ACL wildcard injection (cross-tenant authorization bypass) plus a remote-unauthenticated DoS cluster, a Will-message authorization bypass, and a cross-session durable-corruption bug
Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.
QFinch assessment
moquette is reachable by untrusted MQTT clients (anonymous by default), so every byte from any client, including pre-authentication, is untrusted. This is a memory-safe JVM: the ceiling is authorization/ACL bypass + denial of service + cross-session integrity, **not RCE** (I did not find one and do not claim one). Audited at commit `da7f719a6bab9829d520b5838e13ea7b1f9be3ef`, module `broker/`.
Evidence: public source recordsAffected products
| Affected package, product or range | Fix status |
|---|---|
| Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions. | Consult source advisory |
Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.
Remediation
Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.
- Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
- Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
- Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Evidence coverage
- SSVC priority
- MEDIUM
- Confidence
- Not available
- Aliases
- None reported
Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.
Sources and record history
Record history
Published Sep 23, 2026 · Last refreshed Nov 3, 2026