Shescape: Shell injection via unescaped parentheses on Windows with CMD
Published Aug 12, 2026 · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Original summary
Normalized public record · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Shescape: Shell injection via unescaped parentheses on Windows with CMD
Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.
QFinch assessment
This impacts users of Shescape on Windows that explicitly configure `shell` to CMD, or `true` with the default shell being CMD, using the `escape` and `escapeAll` APIs.
Potential impact
This impacts users of Shescape on Windows that explicitly configure shell to CMD, or true with the default shell being CMD, using the escape and escapeAll APIs. An attacker may be able to achieve shell injection depending on the original command.
Evidence: public source recordsAffected products
| Affected package, product or range | Fix status |
|---|---|
| Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions. | Consult source advisory |
Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.
Remediation
Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.
- Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
- Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
- Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Evidence coverage
- SSVC priority
- LOW
- Confidence
- Not available
- Aliases
- None reported
Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.
Sources and record history
- Patch commit ↗
- Patch commit ↗
- Source repository ↗
- Source repository ↗
- Source repository ↗
- Source repository ↗
- Security advisory ↗
Record history
Published Aug 12, 2026 · Last refreshed Nov 3, 2026