Smarty: SSRF via redirect bypass of trusted_uri using {fetch}
Published Aug 31, 2026 · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Original summary
Normalized public record · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Smarty: SSRF via redirect bypass of trusted_uri using {fetch}
Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.
QFinch assessment
When a Security policy is active, {fetch} validates the requested remote URL against the trusted_uri allowlist via Security::isTrustedUri(). For non-http:// schemes (e.g. https://) the resource was then read with file_get_contents(), which follows HTTP redirects by default. Because isTrustedUri() only validates the initial URL, an open redirect on an otherwise-trusted host could be used to redirect the request to a non-trusted, internal target — bypassing the trusted_uri policy.
Evidence: public source recordsAffected products
| Affected package, product or range | Fix status |
|---|---|
| Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions. | Consult source advisory |
Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.
Remediation
Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.
- Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
- Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
- Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Evidence coverage
- SSVC priority
- LOW
- Confidence
- Not available
- Aliases
- None reported
Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.
Sources and record history
- Security advisory ↗
- Source repository ↗
- Patch commit ↗
- Patch commit ↗
- Source repository ↗
- Source repository ↗
Record history
Published Aug 31, 2026 · Last refreshed Nov 3, 2026