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Vulnerability record · public intelligence
CVE-2026-62987
MEDIUM

Fabio - Incomplete fix for CVE-2025-48865: operator-configured trust headers (clientip/tls/requestid) still strippable via the Connection header

Published Sep 21, 2026 · Updated Nov 3, 2026

Severity · CVSSMEDIUM · Not scored
Known exploitationNot listed
EPSS / likelihood0.20%
QFinch risk scoreNot available

Original summary

Normalized public record · Updated Nov 3, 2026

Fabio - Incomplete fix for CVE-2025-48865: operator-configured trust headers (clientip/tls/requestid) still strippable via the Connection header

Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.

QFinch assessment

The v1.6.6 fix for CVE-2025-48865 sweeps the client Connection header against a hardcoded allowlist protectHeaders (proxy/httpheaders.go:28-36) containing only the 7 X-Forwarded family headers. Fabio also injects three operator-configured server-side trust headers that are NOT in that allowlist, so the original hop-by-hop stripping attack still works against them.

Potential impact

Where a backend trusts these fabio-set headers, an external unauthenticated client can strip/downgrade the trust signal: bypass/poison IP-based ACL or audit that reads the clientip header, downgrade a TLS-terminated request to appear non-TLS to a backend keying off the TLS header, or drop request-id correlation. Scope: deployments that enable the relevant proxy.header. option (all empty by default). Fix: add the configured ClientIPHeader/TLSHeader/RequestID names to the protectHeaders set (or strip their token from the inbound Connection header) inside addHeaders. Parent: CVE-2025-48865 / GHSA-q7p4-7xjv-j3wf (fixed in v1.6.6). This is an incomplete-fix sibling - the same hop-by-hop stripping primitive applies to the operator-configured trust headers the allowlist does not cover.

Technical context

The three unprotected trust headers and where fabio sets them: - ClientIPHeader (proxy.header.clientip) - httpheaders.go:73 r.Header.Set(cfg.ClientIPHeader, remoteIP) - TLSHeader (proxy.header.tls) - httpheaders.go:153 r.Header.Set(cfg.TLSHeader, cfg.TLSHeaderValue) (TLS connections) - RequestID (proxy.header.requestid) - httpproxy.go:90 r.Header.Set(p.Config.RequestID, id()) Order of operations in HTTPProxy.ServeHTTP: (1) line 90 sets RequestID; (2) line 175 calls addHeaders, which sweeps the Connection header (keeping the three configured names because they are absent from protectHeaders) and then sets ClientIPHeader/TLSHeader; (3) line 223 runs the Go httputil.ReverseProxy, whose removeHopByHopHeaders (Go stdlib net/http/httputil/reverseproxy.go) iterates the inbound Connection header and h.Dels every listed header. The three trust headers fabio just set are therefore deleted before the request reaches the backend.

Evidence: public source records

Affected products

Affected scope reported by the available public evidence
Affected package, product or rangeFix status
Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions.Consult source advisory

Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.

Remediation

Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.

  1. Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
  2. Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
  3. Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Review primary references

Evidence coverage

FIRST-EPSSCVE-LIST-V5
SSVC priority
LOW
Confidence
Not available
Aliases
None reported

Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.

Sources and record history

  1. Security advisory ↗
  2. Patch commit ↗
  3. Source repository ↗

Record history

Published Sep 21, 2026 · Last refreshed Nov 3, 2026