Gitea Org-mode file disclosure and code execution
Published Oct 14, 2026 · Updated Oct 23, 2026
Original summary
Normalized public record · Updated Oct 23, 2026
Gitea Org-mode file disclosure and code execution
Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.
QFinch assessment
Gitea's Org-mode markup renderer processes INCLUDE directives supplied to the repository markup endpoint without preventing access to server-side files. An unauthenticated attacker can use a suitable public repository to read files accessible to the Gitea service account. If the disclosed files include app.ini and its INTERNAL_TOKEN, the attacker can chain the disclosure with internal logger access to modify a Git hook and execute commands as the Gitea service account.
Evidence: public source recordsAffected products
| Affected package, product or range | Fix status |
|---|---|
| Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions. | Consult source advisory |
Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.
Remediation
Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.
- Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
- Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
- Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Evidence coverage
- SSVC priority
- IMMEDIATE
- Confidence
- 60%
- Aliases
- None reported
Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.
Sources and record history
- Security advisory ↗
- Source repository ↗
- Gitea 1.27.1 release announcement ↗
- Source repository ↗
- Source repository ↗
- www.openwall.com ↗
Record history
Published Oct 14, 2026 · Last refreshed Oct 23, 2026