devpi-server may leak database contents
Published Sep 14, 2026 · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Original summary
Normalized public record · Updated Nov 3, 2026
devpi-server may leak database contents
Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.
QFinch assessment
If the replication protocol is enabled by using the ``primary`` (or deprecated ``master``) role for a server instance, then the ``+changelog`` URL route can be used to read the complete database content including password hashes, and the ids and salts of tokens from ``devpi-tokens`` by using a trivially modified GET request.
Potential impact
If the replication protocol is enabled by using the primary (or deprecated master) role for a server instance, then the +changelog URL route can be used to read the complete database content including password hashes, and the ids and salts of tokens from devpi-tokens by using a trivially modified GET request. The leaked hashes use the argon2 algorithm, so they are not immediately at risk by brute-force methods, but dictionary attacks are feasible. If a database leak could have happened, it is advised to change the passwords after a patched version or other mitigation is in place. When devpi-tokens is in use, the quality of the server secret is important. It might be possible to derive the server secret if actual tokens are public by using similar techniques to finding the password for a hash. If a database leak could have happened and any tokens are public, it is advised to change the server secret. Besides the information leak this can be used to produce significant CPU, IO and bandwidth usage depending on the database size.
Evidence: public source recordsAffected products
| Affected package, product or range | Fix status |
|---|---|
| Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions. | Consult source advisory |
Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.
Remediation
Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.
- Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
- Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
- Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Evidence coverage
- SSVC priority
- LOW
- Confidence
- Not available
- Aliases
- None reported
Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.
Sources and record history
Record history
Published Sep 14, 2026 · Last refreshed Nov 3, 2026