@angular/core: Angular Template and Dynamic Component Namespace Bypass leading to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
Published Jun 22, 2026 · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Original summary
Normalized public record · Updated Nov 3, 2026
@angular/core: Angular Template and Dynamic Component Namespace Bypass leading to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.
QFinch assessment
An issue in the `@angular/core` package allows bypassing script-execution restrictions during dynamic component creation.
Potential impact
Any Angular application that registers dynamic components based on user-supplied parameters (like selectors or host elements) is vulnerable to this security bypass. Once exploited, this allows a malicious actor to mount a dynamic component on a script tag, bypassing core dynamic component creation safeguards to execute arbitrary JavaScript within the target user's browser context. This could lead to session hijacking, sensitive data exposure, or unauthorized actions on behalf of the user.
Evidence: public source recordsAffected products
| Affected package, product or range | Fix status |
|---|---|
| Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions. | Consult source advisory |
Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.
Remediation
Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.
- Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
- Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
- Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Evidence coverage
- SSVC priority
- LOW
- Confidence
- Not available
- Aliases
- None reported
Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.
Sources and record history
Record history
Published Jun 22, 2026 · Last refreshed Nov 3, 2026