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Vulnerability record · public intelligence
CVE-2026-46437
MEDIUM

wger: API credentials remain valid after logout/password change

Published Oct 7, 2026 · Updated Oct 23, 2026 · Also known as GHSA-v3x9-6gg8-c2c9

Severity · CVSSMEDIUM · 4.8
Known exploitationNot listed
EPSS / likelihood0.18%
QFinch risk scoreNot available

Original summary

Normalized public record · Updated Oct 23, 2026

wger: API credentials remain valid after logout/password change

Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.

QFinch assessment

A vulnerability exists in the authentication/session lifecycle of wger where bearer-style API credentials remain valid after a user logs out and after a user changes their password. An attacker who steals a victim’s DRF authtoken (Authorization: Token ...) or JWT refresh token can continue to access protected /api/v2/ endpoints until the token is manually rotated/deleted (DRF token) or naturally expires (JWT refresh). lifecycle events do not revoke these credentials: - Logout (/user/logout) only clears the Django session cookie via djangologout() and does not revoke API tokens. - Password change updates the password hash, but does not revoke: - existing DRF tokens stored in authtokentoken - existing JWT refresh tokens (no server-side revocation list or token versioning); refresh can continue minting new access tokens until refresh expiry. Vulnerable Files - wger/wger/core/views/user.py (logout implementation) - wger/settings/settingsglobal.py (DRF auth configuration, SimpleJWT defaults) - wger/settings/main.py (commonly used production defaults for JWT lifetimes) - wger/wger/utils/apitoken.py (authtoken rotation is manual only)

Potential impact

A user logs into the wger mobile app, their DRF token is intercepted via a MitM on a public WiFi network. The user notices suspicious activity, changes their password and logs out. Despite these remediation steps, the attacker's copy of the token remains fully valid. If an attacker obtains a victim’s API credential once, the victim’s primary remediation actions (logout and password change) do not terminate attacker access. - Confidentiality: attacker retains access to victim’s private API data (depends on endpoints used). - Integrity: attacker can perform any API mutations permitted to the victim’s account.

Evidence: public source records

Affected products

Affected scope reported by the available public evidence
Affected package, product or rangeFix status
Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions.Consult source advisory

Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.

Remediation

Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.

  1. Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
  2. Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
  3. Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Review primary references

Evidence coverage

CVENVDEPSSGHSA
SSVC priority
LOW
Confidence
Not available
Aliases
GHSA-v3x9-6gg8-c2c9

Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.

Sources and record history

  1. Security advisory ↗
  2. Source repository ↗

Record history

Published Oct 7, 2026 · Last refreshed Oct 23, 2026