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Vulnerability record · public intelligence
CVE-2026-45785
MEDIUM

OpenMcdf: Uncatchable infinite loop in DirectoryTree.TryGetDirectoryEntry on crafted CFB directory cycle

Published Jul 17, 2026 · Updated Oct 23, 2026 · Also known as GHSA-5qwm-7pvp-w988

Severity · CVSSMEDIUM · 6.2
Known exploitationNot listed
EPSS / likelihood0.18%
QFinch risk scoreNot available

Original summary

Normalized public record · Updated Oct 23, 2026

OpenMcdf: Uncatchable infinite loop in DirectoryTree.TryGetDirectoryEntry on crafted CFB directory cycle

Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.

QFinch assessment

The BST name-lookup loop in DirectoryTree.TryGetDirectoryEntry (OpenMcdf/DirectoryTree.cs:35-46) walks directory entries by repeatedly calling directories.TryGetSibling(child, siblingType, validateColor). A crafted CFB file with cyclic Left/Right sibling links among directory entries - constructed so the per-step BST-order check in TryGetSibling (DirectoryEntries.cs:84-85) is satisfied at every step - drives this while (child is not null) loop forever. There is no cycle detection in TryGetDirectoryEntry.

Potential impact

A denial of service affecting any application that opens untrusted CFB files with OpenMcdf. A small crafted input with a cyclic directory tree reaches the unprotected BST name-lookup in DirectoryTree.TryGetDirectoryEntry, hit by any caller of OpenStorage / TryOpenStorage / OpenStream / TryOpenStream - including the very common pattern of iterating EnumerateEntries() and calling OpenStream(entry.Name) per Stream entry. The cycles bypass the per-step BST-order check in TryGetSibling, so no exception is thrown and try/catch cannot protect callers. The affected thread is unrecoverable without killing the process. Downstream CFB consumers (e.g. .msg-file parsers) inherit transitively.

Technical context

The recent Brent's-algorithm commit (24f445a) protects DirectoryTreeEnumerator and works correctly for both attached repros - pure EnumerateEntries() throws FileFormatException: Directory tree contains a loop cleanly. The unprotected code path is the lookup-by-name loop, which is reached from multiple public APIs: - RootStorage.OpenStorage(name) / TryOpenStorage(name) - RootStorage.OpenStream(name) / TryOpenStream(name) The second one matters most: typical consumers iterate EnumerateEntries() and call OpenStream(entry.Name) per Stream entry. With Brent's algorithm catching the enumeration cycle but not the per-entry lookup, callers can still hang as soon as they touch a streamed entry.

Evidence: public source records

Affected products

Affected scope reported by the available public evidence
Affected package, product or rangeFix status
Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions.Consult source advisory

Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.

Remediation

Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.

  1. Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
  2. Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
  3. Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Review primary references

Evidence coverage

CVENVDOSVEPSSGHSA
SSVC priority
LOW
Confidence
Not available
Aliases
GHSA-5qwm-7pvp-w988

Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.

Sources and record history

  1. Security advisory ↗
  2. Patch commit ↗
  3. Source repository ↗

Record history

Published Jul 17, 2026 · Last refreshed Oct 23, 2026