OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation: Java TLS ioctl kprobe allows kernel memory disclosure

QFinch assessment

The Java TLS ioctl probe reads user-controlled ioctl pointers with bpfproberead instead of bpfprobereaduser. An instrumented local process can therefore point OBI at kernel memory and cause that memory to be copied into telemetry.

Potential impact

This is a local kernel memory disclosure primitive reachable from unprivileged instrumented processes. It affects deployments that enable Java TLS support. Successful exploitation can expose kernel memory contents to the privileged OBI agent and then to downstream telemetry systems.

Technical context

The vulnerable path is in bpf/generictracer/javatls.c. The kprobe hooks dovfsioctl, filters on fd == 0 and the Java TLS magic command, and then treats the third ioctl argument as a structured buffer. It reads fields from that pointer using bpfproberead, including: - the operation byte from arg - connection metadata from arg + 1 - the payload length from arg + 1 + sizeof(connectioninfot) If len > 0, it computes buf = arg + 1 + sizeof(connectioninfot) + sizeof(u32) and passes that pointer into handlebufwithconnection. The next stage, bpf/generictracer/ktracerdefs.h, uses bpfproberead(args->smallbuf, MINHTTP2SIZE, (void )args->ubuf); on the supplied pointer and tail-calls deeper protocol logic. The HTTP protocol path then reads from ubuf and emits the bytes through bpfringbufoutput in bpf/generictracer/protocolhttp.h. Because the ioctl pointer originates in user space, the probe should be using bpfprobereaduser with strict length validation. Using bpfproberead instead makes it possible for an instrumented process to supply a kernel pointer and exfiltrate kernel-resident bytes into telemetry.