OpenCTI: Authorization Bypass via `synchronized-upsert` HTTP Header Injection
Published Jul 8, 2026 · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Original summary
Normalized public record · Updated Nov 3, 2026
OpenCTI: Authorization Bypass via `synchronized-upsert` HTTP Header Injection
Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.
QFinch assessment
OpenCTI is an open source platform for managing cyber threat intelligence knowledge and observables. Prior to 7.260326.0, an authorization bypass vulnerability in OpenCTI allows any authenticated user with KNOWLEDGE_KNUPDATE permission to bypass Confidence Level validation and Object Marking restrictions by injecting the synchronized-upsert: true HTTP header, enabling attackers to downgrade confidence levels, remove security markings such as TLP:RED, manipulate relationships, and affect STIX object types including Indicators, ThreatActors, Malware, and Reports. This issue is fixed in version 7.260326.0.
Evidence: public source recordsAffected products
| Affected package, product or range | Fix status |
|---|---|
| Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions. | Consult source advisory |
Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.
Remediation
Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.
- Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
- Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
- Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Evidence coverage
- SSVC priority
- MEDIUM
- Confidence
- Not available
- Aliases
- None reported
Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.
Sources and record history
Record history
Published Jul 8, 2026 · Last refreshed Nov 3, 2026