AVideo has SQL Injection in category.php fixCleanTitle() via Unparameterized clean_title and id Variables
Published Mar 27, 2026 · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Original summary
Normalized public record · Updated Nov 3, 2026
AVideo has SQL Injection in category.php fixCleanTitle() via Unparameterized clean_title and id Variables
Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.
QFinch assessment
The fixCleanTitle() static method in objects/category.php constructs a SQL SELECT query by directly interpolating both $cleantitle and $id into the query string without using prepared statements or parameterized queries. An attacker who can trigger category creation or renaming with a crafted title value can inject arbitrary SQL.
Potential impact
- Type: SQL Injection (CWE-89) - Severity: High - Authentication required: Admin-level (category management), though the same pattern may be reachable via lower-privilege paths depending on plugin configuration - Impact: Full database read; credentials, private video metadata, user PII accessible via UNION injection - Fix: Replace direct interpolation with parameterized queries — use ? placeholders and pass $cleantitle and (int)$id as bound parameters
Technical context
File: objects/category.php Vulnerable code: Both $cleantitle (a user-supplied category name after slug conversion) and $id (the category ID being edited) are embedded directly into the SQL string. The $cleantitle value derives from user input through the category save workflow — it is the "clean" URL-slug version of whatever category name the user submits. No escaping or parameterization is applied before the value is placed inside single quotes in the query.
Evidence: public source recordsAffected products
| Affected package, product or range | Fix status |
|---|---|
| Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions. | Consult source advisory |
Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.
Remediation
Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.
- Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
- Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
- Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Evidence coverage
- SSVC priority
- MEDIUM
- Confidence
- Not available
- Aliases
- None reported
Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.
Sources and record history
Record history
Published Mar 27, 2026 · Last refreshed Nov 3, 2026