sigstore-ruby verifier returns success for DSSE bundles with mismatched in-toto subject digest
Published Mar 10, 2026 · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Original summary
Normalized public record · Updated Nov 3, 2026
sigstore-ruby verifier returns success for DSSE bundles with mismatched in-toto subject digest
Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.
QFinch assessment
Sigstore::Verifierverify does not propagate the VerificationFailure returned by verifyintoto when the artifact digest does not match the digest in the in-toto attestation subject. As a result, verification of DSSE bundles containing in-toto statements returns VerificationSuccess regardless of whether the artifact matches the attested subject.
Potential impact
An attacker who possesses a valid signed DSSE bundle containing an in-toto attestation for artifact A can present it as a valid attestation for a different artifact B. All other verification checks (DSSE envelope signature, certificate chain, Rekor inclusion, SCTs, policy) pass because they are independent of the artifact content. Only the in-toto subject digest check detects the mismatch, and its result is discarded. This allows an attacker to bypass artifact-to-attestation binding for any consumer that relies on Sigstore::Verifierverify to validate DSSE/in-toto bundles.
Technical context
In lib/sigstore/verifier.rb, the verify method calls verifyintoto (line 176) without capturing or checking its return value: verifyintoto(input, intoto) When verifyintoto detects a digest mismatch, it returns a VerificationFailure object. Because the caller discards this return value, execution unconditionally falls through to return VerificationSuccess. This is the only verification sub-check in the method (out of 12) whose failure is not propagated. The messagesignature code path is not affected.
Evidence: public source recordsAffected products
| Affected package, product or range | Fix status |
|---|---|
| Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions. | Consult source advisory |
Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.
Remediation
Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.
- Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
- Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
- Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Evidence coverage
- SSVC priority
- MEDIUM
- Confidence
- Not available
- Aliases
- None reported
Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.
Sources and record history
Record history
Published Mar 10, 2026 · Last refreshed Nov 3, 2026