Caddy: Improper sanitization of glob characters in file matcher may lead to bypassing security protections
Published Feb 24, 2026 · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Original summary
Normalized public record · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Caddy: Improper sanitization of glob characters in file matcher may lead to bypassing security protections
Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.
QFinch assessment
The path sanitization in file matcher doesn't sanitize backslashes which can lead to bypassing path related security protections.
Potential impact
This vulnerability may allow an attacker to bypass security protections. It affects users with specific Caddy and environment configurations.
Technical context
The tryfiles directive is used to rewrite the request uri. It accepts a list of patterns and checks if any files exist in the root that match the provided patterns. It's commonly used in Caddy configs. For example, it's used in SPA applications to rewrite every route that doesn't exist as a file to index.html. the request path and then is expanded by fs.Glob. The request path is sanitized before being placed inside the pattern and the special chars are escaped . The following code is the sanitization part. The problem here is that it does not escape backslashes. /something-\/ can match a file named something-\-anything.txt, but it should not. The primitive that this vulnerability provides is not very useful, as it only allows an attacker to guess filenames that contain a backslash and they should also know the characters before that backslash. The backslash is mainly used to escape special characters in glob patterns, but when it appears before non special characters, it is ignored. This means that h\ello matches hello world even though e is not a special character. This behavior can be abused to bypass path protections that might be in place. For example, if there is a reverse proxy that only allows /documents/ to the internal network and its upstream is a Caddy server that uses tryfiles, the reverse proxy's protection can be bypassed by requesting the path /do%5ccuments/. Some configurations that implement blacklisting and serving together in Caddy are also vulnerable but there's a condition that the tryfiles directive and the filtering route/handle must not be in a same block because tryfiles directive executes before route and handle directives. For example the following config isn't vulnerable. But this one is vulnerable. This config is also vulnerable because Header directives executes before tryfiles.
Evidence: public source recordsAffected products
| Affected package, product or range | Fix status |
|---|---|
| Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions. | Consult source advisory |
Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.
Remediation
Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.
- Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
- Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
- Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Evidence coverage
- SSVC priority
- LOW
- Confidence
- Not available
- Aliases
- None reported
Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.
Sources and record history
Record history
Published Feb 24, 2026 · Last refreshed Nov 3, 2026