Welcart e-Commerce <= 2.12.1 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion via PHP Object Injection via 'reserve' Checkout Parameter and 'option' EDY Callback
Published Sep 5, 2026 · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Original summary
Normalized public record · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Welcart e-Commerce <= 2.12.1 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion via PHP Object Injection via 'reserve' Checkout Parameter and 'option' EDY Callback
Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.
QFinch assessment
The Welcart e-Commerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to PHP Object Injection in all versions up to, and including, 2.12.1 via deserialization of untrusted input in the Telecom EDY payment callback (usces_action_acting_transaction). Unauthenticated attackers can store arbitrary 'reserve' key/value pairs as order metadata during a public checkout, then invoke the callback with an attacker-chosen 'option' parameter to select and unserialize that metadata without any provider signature, source-address, transaction-identity or ownership check. A POP chain is present in the TCPDF library bundled with the plugin itself, so no additional plugin or theme is required. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server, including wp-config.php, which can lead to remote code execution when an attacker re-runs the WordPress installer against a database they control. Successful exploitation is contingent on an admin printing an invoice to trigger file deletion.
Evidence: public source recordsAffected products
| Affected package, product or range | Fix status |
|---|---|
| Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions. | Consult source advisory |
Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.
Remediation
Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.
- Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
- Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
- Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Evidence coverage
- SSVC priority
- MEDIUM
- Confidence
- Not available
- Aliases
- None reported
Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.
Sources and record history
- www.wordfence.com ↗
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org ↗
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org ↗
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org ↗
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org ↗
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org ↗
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org ↗
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org ↗
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org ↗
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org ↗
Record history
Published Sep 5, 2026 · Last refreshed Nov 3, 2026