TeamDavid: Header Injection leading to Open Redirect via URL-encoded characters
Published Aug 7, 2026 · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Original summary
Normalized public record · Updated Nov 3, 2026
TeamDavid: Header Injection leading to Open Redirect via URL-encoded characters
Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.
QFinch assessment
The Webbox of TeamDavid by Tobit Laboratories AG constructs redirect URLs using user-supplied input, which is appended to the redirect target in a 302 HTTP response. By using URL-encoded characters such as “%2e” (representing a dot), an attacker can manipulate the portion of the URL following the top-level domain (TLD). If a similar, registerable TLD exists (for example, if “.com” is the application’s domain, and “.company” is available for registration), an attacker can craft a URL to redirect users to a malicious “.company” domain. By using URL-encoded line feeds, it becomes possible to insert arbitrary response headers in the server's HTTP response.
Evidence: public source recordsAffected products
| Affected package, product or range | Fix status |
|---|---|
| Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions. | Consult source advisory |
Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.
Remediation
Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.
- Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
- Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
- Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Evidence coverage
- SSVC priority
- LOW
- Confidence
- Not available
- Aliases
- None reported
Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.
Sources and record history
Record history
Published Aug 7, 2026 · Last refreshed Nov 3, 2026