phpMyFAQ before 4.1.9 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-beta Missing Current-Password Step-Up on E-mail Change Enables Account Takeover
Published Oct 17, 2026 · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Original summary
Normalized public record · Updated Nov 3, 2026
phpMyFAQ before 4.1.9 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-beta Missing Current-Password Step-Up on E-mail Change Enables Account Takeover
Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.
QFinch assessment
phpMyFAQ before 4.1.9 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-beta does not require the current password when changing an account e-mail in the user control panel (UserController::updateData, api/user/data/update), checking only the session and CSRF token. An attacker with a hijacked session can set the e-mail to their own mailbox and use the password-reset flow to take over non-2FA accounts, including superadmin.
Evidence: public source recordsAffected products
| Affected package, product or range | Fix status |
|---|---|
| Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions. | Consult source advisory |
Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.
Remediation
Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.
- Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
- Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
- Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Evidence coverage
- SSVC priority
- MEDIUM
- Confidence
- Not available
- Aliases
- None reported
Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.
Sources and record history
- Security advisory ↗
- VulnCheck Advisory: phpMyFAQ before 4.1.9 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-beta Missing Current-Password Step-Up on E-mail Change Enables Account Takeover ↗
Record history
Published Oct 17, 2026 · Last refreshed Nov 3, 2026