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Vulnerability record · public intelligence
CVE-2026-108269
CRITICAL

ra-tls-clients: RA-TLS challenge verifier accepted quotes not bound to the TLS session

Published Oct 9, 2026 · Updated Nov 3, 2026

Severity · CVSSCRITICAL · Not scored
Known exploitationNot listed
EPSS / likelihood0.13%
QFinch risk scoreNot available

Original summary

Normalized public record · Updated Nov 3, 2026

ra-tls-clients: RA-TLS challenge verifier accepted quotes not bound to the TLS session

Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.

QFinch assessment

Remote Attestation TLS Clients provides multi-language utilities for verifying attested TLS connections. Prior to 0.5.0, the Rust and Go RA-TLS challenge verifiers accepted quote ReportData that was bound to the certificate public key and client nonce but not to the active TLS session before permitting application traffic. An attacker who obtained an enclave TLS private key could relay a genuine quote onto another connection, causing the clients to accept an attacker-terminated connection as the attested enclave. This issue is fixed in 0.5.0.

Evidence: public source records

Affected products

Affected scope reported by the available public evidence
Affected package, product or rangeFix status
Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions.Consult source advisory

Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.

Remediation

Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.

  1. Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
  2. Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
  3. Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Review primary references

Evidence coverage

FIRST-EPSSCVE-LIST-V5
SSVC priority
LOW
Confidence
Not available
Aliases
None reported

Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.

Sources and record history

  1. Security advisory ↗
  2. Patch commit ↗
  3. Source repository ↗
  4. https://privasys.org/blog/binding-attestation-to-the-tls-session ↗

Record history

Published Oct 9, 2026 · Last refreshed Nov 3, 2026