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Vulnerability record · public intelligence
CVE-2026-104827
HIGH

react/http: Unbounded HTTP Client Response Header Buffering Leads to Memory Exhaustion DoS

Published Oct 15, 2026 · Updated Nov 3, 2026

Severity · CVSSHIGH · Not scored
Known exploitationNot listed
EPSS / likelihood0.52%
QFinch risk scoreNot available

Original summary

Normalized public record · Updated Nov 3, 2026

react/http: Unbounded HTTP Client Response Header Buffering Leads to Memory Exhaustion DoS

Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.

QFinch assessment

React\Http\Browser and its lower-level HTTP stack impose no limit on the size of a response's header section while it is being received. ClientRequestStream::handleData() appends every incoming byte to an internal buffer and only scans that buffer for the \r\n\r\n (or \n\n) terminator, without ever checking its length. A remote server that withholds the terminator and keeps streaming can grow the client's memory without bound until PHP's memorylimit is exhausted and the process crashes. This is an unauthenticated, network-reachable denial of service against any application that uses react/http as a client to fetch untrusted or attacker-influenced URLs, including via redirects.

Potential impact

Remotely triggerable, unauthenticated denial of service against any process using Browser to fetch from an attacker-controlled, compromised or otherwise untrusted endpoint, including one reached through a redirect. No user interaction and no special privileges are required. Because there is no upper bound on the header buffer, a single cheap connection can drive memory arbitrarily high and crash the process, taking down whatever event loop or worker it was running. Confidentiality and integrity are unaffected; availability is fully impacted for that process.

Technical context

ClientRequestStream::handleData() is bound directly to the underlying connection's data event, so every byte the peer sends is appended with no size check: The only exit from the buffering state is finding the header terminator or a connection close, so until it arrives the buffer grows monotonically for as long as the peer keeps sending. The codebase already applies this class of limit elsewhere, but not symmetrically. RequestHeaderParser caps incoming request headers when acting as a server, and Transaction::bufferResponse() caps the response body, but only once the header section has already been parsed into a Response. Response header reception was the one stage with no limit at all.

Evidence: public source records

Affected products

Affected scope reported by the available public evidence
Affected package, product or rangeFix status
Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions.Consult source advisory

Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.

Remediation

Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.

  1. Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
  2. Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
  3. Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Review primary references

Evidence coverage

FIRST-EPSSCVE-LIST-V5
SSVC priority
MEDIUM
Confidence
Not available
Aliases
None reported

Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.

Sources and record history

  1. Security advisory ↗
  2. Patch commit ↗
  3. Source repository ↗

Record history

Published Oct 15, 2026 · Last refreshed Nov 3, 2026