Copier's safe template has filesystem write access outside destination path
Published Aug 18, 2025 · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Original summary
Normalized public record · Updated Nov 3, 2026
Copier's safe template has filesystem write access outside destination path
Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.
QFinch assessment
Copier suggests that it's safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn't use [unsafe](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#unsafe) features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the `--UNSAFE,--trust` flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently write files outside the destination path where a project shall be generated or updated. This is possible when rendering a [generated directory structure](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#generating-a-directory-structure) whose rendered path is either a relative parent path or an absolute path. Constructing such paths is possible using Copier's builtin `pathjoin` Jinja filter and its builtin `_copier_conf.sep` variable, which is the platform-native path separator. This way, a malicious template author can create a template that overwrites arbitrary files (according to the user's write permissions), e.g., to cause havoc.
Potential impact
Copier suggests that it's safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn't use unsafe features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the --UNSAFE,--trust flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently write files outside the destination path where a project shall be generated or updated. This is possible when rendering a generated directory structure whose rendered path is either a relative parent path or an absolute path. Constructing such paths is possible using Copier's builtin pathjoin Jinja filter and its builtin copierconf.sep variable, which is the platform-native path separator. This way, a malicious template author can create a template that overwrites arbitrary files (according to the user's write permissions), e.g., to cause havoc. Write access via generated relative path Reproducible example: Write access via generated absolute path Reproducible example: - POSIX: - Windows (PowerShell): This scenario is slightly less severe, as Copier has a few assertions of the destination path being relative which would typically be raised. But python -O (or PYTHONOPTIMIZE=x) removes asserts, so these guards may be ineffective. In addition, this scenario will prompt for overwrite confirmation or require the --overwrite flag for non-interactive mode; yet malicious file writes might go unnoticed.
Evidence: public source recordsAffected products
| Affected package, product or range | Fix status |
|---|---|
| Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions. | Consult source advisory |
Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.
Remediation
Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.
- Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
- Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
- Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Evidence coverage
- SSVC priority
- LOW
- Confidence
- Not available
- Aliases
- None reported
Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.
Sources and record history
Record history
Published Aug 18, 2025 · Last refreshed Nov 3, 2026