quiche vulnerable to unbounded storage of information related to connection ID retirement
Published Mar 12, 2024 · Updated Oct 23, 2026 · Also known as GHSA-xhg9-xwch-vr7x
Original summary
Normalized public record · Updated Oct 23, 2026
quiche vulnerable to unbounded storage of information related to connection ID retirement
Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.
QFinch assessment
Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to unbounded storage of information related to connection ID retirement, which could lead to excessive resource consumption. Each QUIC connection possesses a set of connection Identifiers (IDs); see [RFC 9000 Section 5.1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-5.1). Endpoints declare the number of active connection IDs they are willing to support using the active_connection_id_limit transport parameter. The peer can create new IDs using a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame but must stay within the active ID limit. This is done by retirement of old IDs, the endpoint sends NEW_CONNECTION_ID includes a value in the retire_prior_to field, which elicits a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame as confirmation. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit the vulnerability by sending NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames and manipulating the connection (e.g. by restricting the peer's congestion window size) so that RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames can only be sent at a slower rate than they are received, leading to storage of information related to connection IDs in an unbounded queue.
Potential impact
Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to unbounded storage of information related to connection ID retirement, which could lead to excessive resource consumption. Each QUIC connection possesses a set of connection Identifiers (IDs); see RFC 9000 Section 5.1. Endpoints declare the number of active connection IDs they are willing to support using the activeconnectionidlimit transport parameter. The peer can create new IDs using a NEWCONNECTIONID frame but must stay within the active ID limit. This is done by retirement of old IDs, the endpoint sends NEWCONNECTIONID includes a value in the retirepriorto field, which elicits a RETIRECONNECTIONID frame as confirmation. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit the vulnerability by sending NEWCONNECTIONID frames and manipulating the connection (e.g. by restricting the peer's congestion window size) so that RETIRECONNECTIONID frames can only be sent at a slower rate than they are received, leading to storage of information related to connection IDs in an unbounded queue.
Evidence: public source recordsAffected products
| Affected package, product or range | Fix status |
|---|---|
| Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions. | Consult source advisory |
Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.
Remediation
Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.
- Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
- Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
- Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Evidence coverage
- SSVC priority
- LOW
- Confidence
- Not available
- Aliases
- GHSA-xhg9-xwch-vr7x
Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.
Sources and record history
Record history
Published Mar 12, 2024 · Last refreshed Oct 23, 2026