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Vulnerability record · public intelligence
CVE-2021-34413
UNKNOWN

CVE-2021-34413

Published Sep 27, 2021 · Updated Nov 3, 2026

Severity · CVSSUNKNOWN · Not scored
Known exploitationNot listed
EPSS / likelihood0.58%
QFinch risk scoreNot available

Original summary

Normalized public record · Updated Nov 3, 2026

All versions of the Zoom Plugin for Microsoft Outlook for MacOS before 5.3.52553.0918 contain a Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOC/TOU) vulnerability during the plugin installation process. This could allow a standard user to write their own malicious application to the plugin directory, allowing the malicious application to execute in a privileged context.

Publisher and source text is retained separately from QFinch interpretation.

QFinch assessment

All versions of the Zoom Plugin for Microsoft Outlook for MacOS before 5.3.52553.0918 contain a Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOC/TOU) vulnerability during the plugin installation process. This could allow a standard user to write their own malicious application to the plugin directory, allowing the malicious application to execute in a privileged context.

Evidence: public source records

Affected products

Affected scope reported by the available public evidence
Affected package, product or rangeFix status
Consult the referenced vendor advisory for affected versions.Consult source advisory

Matching a version is only one part of assessing exposure. QFinch has not assessed your environment on this public page.

Remediation

Apply the vendor-supported fixed release or mitigation, then verify the affected component is no longer reachable.

  1. Confirm the affected product and reachable code path exist in your environment.
  2. Apply the vendor-supported patch or mitigation from the primary advisory.
  3. Rescan the exact deployed revision and retain verification evidence.
Review primary references

Evidence coverage

FIRST-EPSSCVE-LIST-V5
SSVC priority
MEDIUM
Confidence
Not available
Aliases
None reported

Scores appear only when corresponding evidence exists. Missing data is never interpreted as zero risk.

Sources and record history

  1. explore.zoom.us ↗

Record history

Published Sep 27, 2021 · Last refreshed Nov 3, 2026

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